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UNITED STATES v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT HAS LIMITED APPLICABILITY TO ALIENS
ABROAD
MICHELE LEVY COHEN*
It is generally accepted that the fourth amendment and exclusion-
ary rule apply to searches and seizures by United States officials
against American citizens, even when the operation takes place outside
the United States. Any evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment will be excluded at trial.' It is also accepted that the exclu-
sionary rule generally does not apply to searches conducted entirely by
foreign officials.2 Until recently it was unclear whether the fourth
amendment applies when United States officials, acting alone or in con-
juncture with foreign officials, seize evidence from foreign defendants
and then attempt to use the evidence at trial in the United States.3 The
Circuit courts differed in their interpretations of the Constitution and a
solution to this problem.' The Supreme Court resolved this situation in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,5 decided in February 1990. The
Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
held that the fourth amendment does not apply when United States
officials, acting outside the United States, search and seize property
owned by a nonresident alien.
6
This decision is one of importance for several reasons. First, it set-
* Attorney, Ward, Klein & Miller; Member, Maryland Bar; B.A. 1986, Ameri-
can University; J.D. 1990, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). This case established the
exclusionary rule prohibiting the introduction of evidence illegally seized by federal
agents for use in the federal courts. The exclusionary rule was expanded in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) to apply to evidence introduced in state courts. Here the
Supreme Court implied that the rule was a necessary corollary to the fourth amend-
ment and was therefore incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp, at
655-657.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United
States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18 (1st. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
3. The decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez did not address the issue of
searches and seizures made by United States officials while in international waters. It
only involved searches actually made in foreign countries.
4. "Courts that have considered the question of how much American participation
in a foreign search and seizure is required to mandate application of the exclusionary
rule have not been unanimous in their choice of the precise test to be applied." United
States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
5. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
6. Id. at 1059.
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ties a dispute that has raged among the Circuit courts for years7 and
definitively answers the question of whether information collected from
a nonresident, outside the United States, may in fact be used at trial in
the United States. The decision also serves as yet another limitation on
the protections of the fourth amendment. Finally, the decision has a
substantial ramification on the international aspects of the "war on
drugs." There have been several United States-foreign joint law en-
forcement operations in recent years as a result of increased drug traf-
ficking which frequently crosses national boundaries. 8 Given the world-
wide scope of this problem and the existing momentum in the United
States for a crackdown on narcotics importation, it is safe to assume
that United States law enforcement officials will continue to conduct
such operations with their foreign counterparts. The Verdugo-Urquidez
decision suggests that these operations now have judicial approval.
I. PRIOR METHODS OF CIRCUMVENTING THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Prior to the decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
United States officials acting abroad were required to comply with the
warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. Warrants have no le-
gal effect outside the boundaries of the United States. Absent exigent
circumstances, officials were required to obtain a search warrant from a
United States magistrate, demonstrating the necessary level of proba-
ble cause. If officials failed to obtain the necessary warrant, a nonresi-
dent defendant facing trial in the United States was able to success-
fully suppress any evidence found on his property during the
warrantless search.
However, the exclusionary rule generally did not require the sup-
pression of evidence seized by foreign police agents and later turned
over to United States officials. This evidence is admissible in United
States courts except where foreign police conduct shocks the judicial
conscience, American agents participated in the foreign search, or for-
eign officers acted as agents for their American counterparts. 9 This
principle was generally accepted by all federal courts, 10 the rationale
7. See supra note 4.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Hensel, 669 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v.
Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d 993 (2nd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985);
United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1986).
9. Hensel, 699 F.2d at 25.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D.N.Y.
1986); United States v. Stano, 690 F. Supp (E.D.Pa. 1988); United States v. Mount,
757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 487 (9th Cir.
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being that the exclusionary rule is meant to serve as a deterrent to
unlawful conduct by American officials." It has no such effect on for-
eign officials.12 However, if the foreign search falls within one of the
three exceptions listed above, a court will be justified in refusing to
admit the illegally obtained evidence.
A. Conduct By Foreign Officials That Shocks The Conscience
Most courts refuse to accept evidence obtained by foreign officials
abroad if the officers' actions are so outrageous that they shock the
judicial conscience. The issue was first raised in Ker v. Illinois"3 , where
United States officials learned that Ker had fled to Peru, following em-
bezzlement and larceny charges. Instead of making a demand on the
Peruvian government for Ker's surrender, American officials forcibly
arrested Ker and transported him to the United States for trial. Ker
charged that the abduction denied him of his constitutional right to due
process of law. 4 The Supreme Court held that "forcible abduction is
no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought
within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for
[an] offense." 5 Due process was satisfied if the defendant received a
fair and impartial trial. 6 The Supreme Court unequivocally reaffirmed
its position in Frisbie v. Collins." In Frisbie, the defendant claimed
Michigan state officials forcibly and violently abducted him from Illi-
nois and took him back to Michigan to stand trial for murder. The
Court held that "this court has never departed from the rule [in Ker]
that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by
the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by
reason of a 'forcible abduction.' "18
The Court in Rochin v. California"9 broadened the "Ker-Frisbie"
1986).
11. See Mount, 757 F.2d at 1317. "The principal purpose of the exclusionary rule
is the deterrence of unlawful police conduct . . . [thus] foster[ing] obedience to the
mandate of fourth amendment."
12. "In circumstances where application of the rule does not result in appreciable
deterrence, its use is not warranted." Id. at 1317.
13. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
14. Id. at 439-440.
15. Id. at 444. Note that the Court declined to answer the question of how forci-
ble and violent the seizure and transfer must be before a defendant can use this con-
duct as a defense. The Court left this decision up to the state courts and common law.
16. Id. at 440.
17. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
18. Id. at 522.,
19. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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doctrine which held that the Due Process Clause of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments required only a fair trial and did not relate to the
methods in which the defendant was brought to trial, by setting aside a
state court conviction resting on evidence obtained through police bru-
tality. In Rochin, after an unsuccessful attempt to-forcibly extract cap-
sules swallowed by the defendant, state officials brought Rochin to a
hospital where an emetic was forced into his stomach, causing him to
vomit the capsules.2 0 The capsules were later found to contain mor-
phine. 1 Rochin claimed this treatment violated his right to due pro-
cess.2" The Court held that the Due Process Clause required it to "ex-
ercise [judgment] over the whole course of the proceedings ... in order
to ascertain whether they offend . .. decency and fairness . . .Due
process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for
those [fundamental] personal immunities." 2 3  Several cases since
Rochin applied the principle that due process extends to the pretrial
conduct of law enforcement authorities.2 4
Note, as the above cited cases suggest, that although the "shock
the conscience" doctrine began as a bar against improper conduct by
United States officials, courts extended it to apply to passive conduct
by foreign officials as well. However, not all improper conduct by offi-
cials was enough to warrant dismissal of a case under the exclusionary
rule.2 5 Rather, the exception was fairly narrow in that the improper
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 169, citing Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-417 (1944). Note
that the court held that the conduct complained of must "offend [more] than some
fastidious squeamishness ... This [must be] conduct that shocks the conscience." Id. at
172.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
The Second Circuit applied Rochin to its holding in United States v. Toscanino,
500 F.2d 267 (2nd Cir. 1974). Toscanino, an Italian national, was convicted of conspir-
acy to import and distribute narcotics into the United States. The court reversed his
conviction because the conduct of the arresting officers, who kidnapped Toscanino from
Uruguay and tortured him, was so outrageous as to shock the judicial conscience. Tos-
canino, 500 F.2d at 274.
See also United States v. Fernandez-Caro, 677 F.Supp. 893 (S.D.Tex. 1987)(con-
duct of foreign officials in beating defendant and applying electrical shocks to his wet
body, among other things, was sufficiently shocking to require suppression of evidence);
United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956
(1977); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1981).
25. There are several Supreme Court decisions that have reaffirmed the Ker-Fris-
bie doctrine. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In fact, the Second
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conduct had to be excessive.
B. Joint Ventures Between United States And Foreign Officials
The second major exception to the rule admitting evidence ille-
gally seized by foreign officials occurred when American officials par-
ticipated in the search to the extent that the search became a joint
venture.2" This exception was accepted among all the circuits, although
each circuit had its own way of analyzing the issue.27 There was no set
standard for determining when there was sufficient participation by
American officials to constitute a joint venture. 28 However, an overview
of prior case law suggests that the courts were reluctant to find that a
joint venture had taken place.
The seminal case is Stonehill v. United States,29 in which the de-
fendant allegedly avoided paying income tax. American and Philippine
officials held meetings at the home of the United States' official in
preparation for a search in the Philippines.3 0 The Americans made sug-
gestions concerning the search and provided Philippine officials with a
diagram and a memorandum concerning two targeted buildings. 1 Ad-
ditionally, the United States agents located the most significant piece
of evidence during the search of a warehouse. 32 Despite this level of
involvement, the Ninth Circuit held that a joint venture did not exist
between the United States and the Philippines. 33
In United States v. Marzano,3 4 the Seventh Circuit adopted the
Circuit later clarified its holding in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62
(2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) restricting the rule in Toscanino to cases
involving "the use of torture, brutality and similar outrageous conduct." Lujan, 510
F.2d at 65-66.
26. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 960 (1969).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1231 (1 1th Cir.), modi-
fied, 801 F.2d 378 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987); Paternina-Vergara, 749
F.2d at 998; United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 269-71 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977).
28. The court in Morrow observed, "The . . . courts that have considered the
question of how much American participation in a foreign search and seizure is re-
quired to mandate application of the exclusionary rule have not been unanimous in
their choice of the precise test to be applied ... " Morrow, 537 F.2d at 140.
29. 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 746.
34. 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976).
1990]
180 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 14
reasoning in Stonehill. Here, the court held that "providing informa-
tion to a foreign functionary is not sufficient involvement for the Gov-
ernment to be considered a participant in acts the foreign functionary
takes based on that information."a The court further noted that
merely being present during a search does not make federal officers
participants. 36
The Ninth Circuit found that a joint venture existed in United
States v. Peterson.7 The defendants in Peterson were convicted of pos-
session of marijuana in United States customs waters. 3 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the degree of participation between United States and
Philippine officials constituted a joint venture. 39 Specifically, the court
noted that the United States agents termed their action a joint venture,
as they were involved daily in translating and decoding intercepted
transmissions and advised the Philippine officials of their importance.40
The courts also distinguished joint ventures from legitimate law
enforcement cooperation efforts between the United States and another
country, where American involvement is minimal. This type of situa-
tion arose in United States v. Maher.41 Maher was convicted on various
drug charges. "2 He claimed that Canadian officials used an illegal wire-
tap to obtain information given to American agents who used the infor-
mation as the basis for a United States warrant.43 The Ninth Circuit
held that although the wiretap was illegal, the information gained from
the tap was admissible. 4 There was no evidence that American officials
participated in the wiretap and the Canadian officials denied any ille-
gality in obtaining the evidence. Furthermore, it was apparent that the
Canadians initiated and controlled the investigation, with only minimal
35. Id. at 270.
36. Id. See also Government of the Canal Zone v. Sierra, 594 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.
1979)(no joint venture where the search was solely under the jurisdiction of the foreign
government, even though American officials provided important information leading to
the search of the defendant's home and was present during the search); United States
v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980)(fact that defendant was arrested by British
officials on a tip from American agents was insufficient to establish American partici-
pation); United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F.Supp. 1253 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)(fact that
search was motivated by tip from United States officials is not sufficient justification to
apply the fourth amendment).
37. 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 490.
40. Id.
41. 645 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1981).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 782.
44. id.
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support and assistance from the Americans. Therefore a joint venture
did not exist."6
This was the state of the law with respect to searches of property
located outside the United States and owned by nonresident aliens
prior to the decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. This deci-
sion would seem to negate the applicability of the joint venture excep-
tion as American officials themselves need no longer comply with the
fourth amendment warrant requirements when operating abroad. How-
ever, the "shock the conscience" exception probably remains valid be-
cause it always applied to improper conduct by any official, including
foreign officials.
II. UNITED STATES V. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ"
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez is a citizen and resident of Mex-
ico.' 7 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials suspected
Verdugo-Urquidez of being among the leaders of a large and violent
Mexican-based drug organization.' 8 He was also a suspect in the kid-
napping and torture-murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena
Salazar. 49 The DEA obtained a United States warrant for his arrest on
August 3, 1985. 50 At the DEA's request, Mexican officials arrested
Verdugo-Urquidez at his home in Mexico in January, 1986 and turned
him over to American officials in the United States.51 Following the
arrest, DEA agents arranged with Mexican officials to search Verdugo-
Urquidez's Mexican residences for evidence of his drug smuggling ac-
tivities and his involvement in the Salazar kidnapping and murder.,2
The Mexican Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police
(MF JP) authorized the DEA search. 53 The DEA and MF JP officers
then searched Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexican residences and seized cer-
tain documents.6 ' At no time did the DEA seek approval from the
United States Justice Department or the United States Attorney's Of-
fice. The DEA did not request a search warrant from a United States
45. Id.
46. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
52. Verdugo-Urquidez was later convicted of the kidnapping and murder charges
in a separate prosecution. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
1990]
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magistrate. 55
The District Court for the Southern District of California granted
Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the
searches, holding that the searches constituted a joint venture between
the DEA and Mexican officials5" and therefore, the fourth amendment
applied. The fourth amendment's requirements were not met because
the DEA failed to obtain a valid search warrant and was unable to
justify searching the premises without the warrant.5 7 A majority of the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, 58 relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
Reid v. Covert59 and INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.10 Based on these deci-
sions, the majority held that "[t]he Constitution imposes substantive
constraints on the federal government, even when it operates abroad,"6 "
and that Verdugo-Urquidez was entitled to the same rights enjoyed by
other aliens facing judicial proceedings in the United States.6 2 The ma-
jority also noted that an alien defendant facing trial in the United
States was entitled to fifth and sixth amendment rights, 3 and it would
be "odd" to grant Verdugo-Urquidez these protections, but not fourth
amendment protections.6 4 Therefore, the DEA search was unconstitu-
tional because the DEA agents failed to obtain a search warrant.6 5
The dissenting judge argued that United States laws have no effect
in foreign territories, except with respect to American citizens, and
55. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1215-1217 (9th Cir.
1988).
56. Id. at 1217. The court also held that a foreign national generally may seek the
suppression of evidence seized by American officials during a search conducted abroad
on the grounds that the search violates the standards set by the fourth amendment.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The Court held in Reid that American civilians tried by
United States military authorities in a foreign country were still entitled to fifth and
sixth amendment protections.
60. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). The Supreme Court held in Lopez-Mendoza that ille-
gal aliens in the United States had fourth amendment rights.
61. 856 F.2d at 1218.
62. Id. at 1223. The court was referring to the fourth amendment rights of aliens
living illegally in the United States to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
63. The fifth amendment ensures that a defendant receives due process of law and
the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to a fair trial. U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V, VI.
64. 856 F.2d at 1224.
65. The Court of Appeals noted that a search warrant would have no legal effect
in Mexico. However, a warrant would be of value in the United States because it would
show an independent finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate. Additionally,
the warrant would also define the scope of the search. Id. at 1230.
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Verdugo-Urquidez could not claim fourth amendment rights.66 The dis-
sent also argued that the Constitution was intended as a "compact"
between the newly created government and the people of the United
States, and that the protections of the fourth amendment were limited
to United States citizens.6" The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide the important constitutional issues involved.6 8
A five-member majority of the Supreme Court reversed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals.69 The majority held that the fourth
amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by American offi-
cials of property located in a foreign country and owned by a nonresi-
dent alien.7" The majority noted as a preliminary matter that fourth
amendment protections are triggered at the time the search and seizure
occur.71 Here, the search took place in Mexico; any constitutional vio-
lation could only have occurred there.72 Next, the majority adopted a
"Compact Theory" interpretation of the Constitution, holding that the
wording and history behind the creation of the Constitution indicated
that the fourth amendment was intended to apply only to United States
citizens and aliens who had sufficient contacts with the United States
to bring them within the national community. 3 Verdugo-Urquidez, the
Court held, did not have sufficient contacts within the United States to
make him one of "the people" within the definition of the Compact
Theory.74
66. Id. The dissent relied on the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
67. 856 F.2d at 1232. The dissent described at length the period leading up to the
Revolutionary War. "Prevalent during the period leading to the American Revolution
was the recurrent notion that a government was created by a compact among those
governed . . ."
68. 110 S. Ct. at 1060.
69. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored the majority
opinion, and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Kennedy also filed
a separate concurring opinion. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
and by Justice Blackmun.
70. 110 S. Ct. at 1066.
71. Id. at 1060.
72. Id. at 1060. The fourth amendment "prohibits 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' . . . and a violation of the amendment is 'fully accomplished' at the time of
an unreasonable governmental intrusion." Id. citing United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 354 (1974). This is different from fifth amendment protections which are
fundamental trial rights. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
73. 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
74. Id., relying on United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292
(1904)(alien was not entitled to first amendment rights because "[hie does not become
1990]
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The majority went on to reject the argument that the Constitution
applies wherever the United States exercises its power, stating that this
theory was contrary to the Court's previous holdings in the "Insular
Cases '"75 and in Johnson v. Eisentrager.7' Finally, the majority held
that a contrary decision would create serious difficulties in conducting
future United States foreign operations and suggested that the legisla-
tive or executive branches impose restrictions on searches and
seizures."
Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which he agreed
that no violation of the fourth amendment occurred. 78 However, he
stated that the Insular Cases did not stand for the proposition that the
Constitution never applies to nonresident aliens when the government
acts abroad.79 Rather these cases stand for the proposition that the gov-
-ernment is not bound by the fourth amendment warrant requirements
where the circumstances presented would make adherence to the re-
quirements impracticable.8" In the situation presented in Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, it would be impracticable to require a search warrant, due to
"[t]he absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue war-
rants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasona-
bleness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with
foreign officials all indicate that the fourth amendment's warrant re-
quirements should not apply in Mexico as it does in this country."'"
Justice Stevens also filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only.82
He argued that Verdugo-Urquidez became one of "the people," enti-
tled to fourth amendment protections because he was being held in the
one of the people to whom these things are secured by our Constitution.
75. This line of cases stood for the proposition that certain constitutional provi-
sions do not apply when the government acts abroad. See, e.g., Balzac v. Puerto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922), where the constitution was held not to apply even though the
United States government had sovereign power over the territory of Puerto Rico. See
also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)(constitutional clauses relating to revenue
did not apply in Puerto Rico); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903)(provisions on
indictment by a grand jury and jury trial did not apply in Hawaii); Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904)(jury trial provisions did not apply in the Philippines);
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914)(sixth amendment grand jury provisions
did not apply in the Philippines).
76. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
77. 110 S. Ct. at 1066.
78. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 1067.
80. Id. at 1068.
81. Id. at 1068 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82. 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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United States at the time of the search.8" However, Justice Stevens
stated that the use of the evidence at trial was proper as the DEA
search was reasonable. 4
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, holding the
United States is a government of limited powers. 5 Therefore, the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment were not meant to create rights only
applicable to certain classes of persons.8" Rather, the framers sought to
prohibit an infringement on pre-existing rights.87 Justice Brennan also
noted that aliens are required to comply with United States laws, im-
posing a reciprocal obligation on the United States government to fol-
low its laws with respect to aliens.88 He discounted the majority's con-
clusion that the fourth amendment only applies to aliens having a
voluntary or legal connection with the United States, noting that the
cases cited by the majority lacked these requisites and that the fourth
amendment did not impose these requirements.8 9 In any event,
Verdugo-Urquidez would meet the requirements necessary to establish
a sufficient connection with the United States in order to claim fourth
amendment protections because he was in the United States legally,
although voluntarily.90
Justice Brennan next attacked the majority's rational that Ameri-
can foreign policy operations could be jeopardized if the fourth amend-
ment were to apply to aliens abroad.9 He held that the doctrinal ex-
ceptions to the fourth amendment would protect government
operations. 2 Justice Blackmun dissented separately, holding that while
the government generally is not bound by the fourth amendment when
acting abroad, Verdugo-Urquidez became one of "the governed" when
the government brought him to the United States for trial on criminal
charges.13 This opinion is similar to the conclusions reached by Justice
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J. concurring). Justice Stevens held that the search was
reasonable in that Drug Enforcement Administration officials had the approval and
cooperation of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police. Additionally, he concurred in the
judgment, stating that American magistrates had no power to authorize searches in
foreign residences under the warrant clause.
85. Id. at 1069, 1072 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J. dissenting).
86. Id. at 1071 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1071 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. 110 S. Ct. at 1068-1069 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J. dissenting).
89. Id. at 1070 (Brennan, J. and Marshall,. J., dissenting).
90. 110 S. Ct. at 1070-1072 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J. dissenting).
91. Id. at 1074-1075 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1075 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1078 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1990]
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Stevens.94 Justice Blackmun, however, was unable to concur in the ma-
jority's judgment because he concluded that the DEA search was un-
reasonable because the government did not show probable cause.9 5 He
would vacate the Court of Appeals judgment and remand the case."
III. ANALYSIS
Although the majority cited several reasons against applying the
warrant requirements of the fourth amendment to searches of property
owned by nonresident aliens and located abroad, 97 in reality, the
Court's opinion rested primarily on its decision to apply the "Compact
Theory" of the Constitution instead of the "Enumerated Powers The-
ory". 98 This decision has a substantial impact on the judiciary's prior
treatment of cases involving this fourth amendment issue. Additionally,
the decision in Verdugo-Urquidez creates a new standard for determin-
ing the application of the Constitution to nonresident aliens, including
issues other than tose presented by the fourth amendment. 99 The re-
mainder of this Note addresses the effect of the Court's decision upon
the earlier treatment of fourth amendment warrant claims brought by
nonresident aliens and examines the constitutional basis for the Court's
holding.
A. Effect of the Decision Upon Previous Methods of Determining
Fourth Amendment Violations
As stated previously, the Supreme Court's decision eliminates the
distinction between searches in foreign countries by foreign officials
which would not have been invalid for lack of a valid warrant, and
identical searches by American officials which would have required a
94. Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring).
95. 110 S. Ct. at 1078 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1061-1066.
98. All of the majority's arguments against extending the fourth amendment pro-
tections to Verdugo-Urquidez stemmed from the premise that the Constitution in gen-
eral does not to apply to nonresident aliens, absent some legal or voluntary connection
to the United States. See supra notes 107-140 and accompanying text. Once this pre-
mise was reached, the majority merely distinguished the situation before it from earlier
cases in which aliens were granted some constitutional protections.
99. Although it appears well established that nonresident aliens are entitled to
such fundamental rights as the right to due process of law and the right to a fair trial
(see supra note 63 and accompanying text), the decision in Verdugo-Urquidez could be
read to deny other protections that are granted to American citizens.
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valid search warrant.100 This also eliminates the need for the joint ven-
ture exception to the general rule that foreign searches conducted by
foreign officials are valid. 1"' This will aid lower courts in deciding mo-
tions to suppress evidence that arises in cases similar to United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez. Rather than making a factual determination as
to whether sufficient United States involvement occurred to term the
foreign operation a joint venture, courts may simply deny the motion
on the grounds that no fourth amendment violation occurred. 02
Although the Verdugo-Urquidez decision will negate the impor-
tance of the joint venture rule, it should have no effect on motions to
suppress evidence acquired through methods that shock the judicial
conscience.'0 3 This doctrine has never been limited to actions by Amer-
ican officials upon foreign nationals that shock the conscience.1
0 4
Rather, the right to due process, guaranteed by the fifth amendment, is
seen as a fundamental right that extends to the pretrial conduct of law
enforcement officials.' 0 5 This right may not be interfered with, even as
against a nonresident alien.'
B. The Constitutional Basis for the Decision
In holding that the fourth amendment warrant requirements do
not apply when the United States government acts against nonresident
aliens, the Supreme Court adopted the "Compact Theory" interpreta-
tion of the Constitution as compared with the "Enumerated Powers
Theory." Proponents of the Compact Theory view the Constitution as a
reciprocal agreement, or compact, between the government and the
people of the United States.'07 The people give the federal government
100. Note that the Supreme Court did not address the need for the search to
comply with the laws of the foreign country. This question should, and probably will,
be resolved as later cases, relying on this decision, arise.
101. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 519 (1952)(American officials used
improper methods to retrieve drug capsules from an American suspect); United States
v. Fernandez-Caro, 677 F.Supp. 893 (S.D.Tex. 1987)(foreign officials tortured a for-
eign suspect to obtain information later used at trial in the United States).
105. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)("[e]ven one whose pres-
ence in this country is unlawful, involuntary or transitory" enjoys fifth amendment
rights); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891)(the guarantees of the fifth and sixth amend-
ments apply to persons brought to the United States for trial).
107. See U.S. CONST. preamble "We the people of the United States ... do or-
dain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
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authority over them, and in exchange the government agrees to act in
accordance with the limitations set forth in the Constitution.1 0 8 Because
the government was "ordained and established 'for the United States of
America,' and not for countries outside of [its] limits . . . [t]he Consti-
tution can have no operation in another country." 09 The Compact The-
ory has been in existence since the formation of the Constitution itself
and there are many cases following the principle that "[tihe govern-
ment of the Union . . . is emphatically and truly, a government of the
people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers
are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for
their benefit."' 10
The majority in Verdugo-Urquidez rejected the Enumerated Pow-
ers Theory, which stands for the proposition that the United States
government is bound by the limitations of the Constitution. Under this
view, there are substantive restraints placed on the government, even
when it operates outside the boundaries of the United States."' One of
the earlier cases utilizing the Enumerated Powers Theory with respect
to the extraterritorial effect of the Constitution is the landmark case of
Reid v. Covert."2 There, a plurality held that the Constitution limits
United States' actions abroad.1 1' Reid only addressed the applicability
of constitutional protections to Americans living abroad and did not
address the rights of aliens brought to trial in the United States. Some
proponents of the Enumerated Powers Theory argue that the Constitu-
tion limits American officials who must act within constitutional limita-
108. See Stephan, Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal
Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 783-784 (1980).
109. In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464.
110. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-405 (1819). See also
League v. DeYoung, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 185, 202 (1850)("The Constitution of the
United States was made by, and for the protection of, the people of the United
States."); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
111. See Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of
the United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 745 (1980).
112. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). This case involved an American civilian living overseas.
She was facing a military trial for killing her husband.
113. The Supreme Court stated in Reid that:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution . . . It can only
act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. When
the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield
which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect
his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be
in another land.
Id. at 5-6.
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tions, regardless of where the actions occur."" Other supporters of the
Enumerated Powers Theory look to the concept of natural or funda-
mental rights to support the idea that constitutional protections apply
to aliens as well as United States citizens." 5
C. Application of the Compact Theory to Verdugo-Urquidez
In applying the Compact Theory to the situation presented in
Verdugo-Urquidez, the majority first noted that historical data, dating
from the late 1700's, indicated that the purpose of the fourth amend-
ment was to protect only American citizens from arbitrary actions by
the newly formed United States government and was not intended to
protect aliens in foreign countries from American operations."'
The majority then referred to a series of cases known as the "Insu-
lar Cases" '  as well as to its decision in Johnson v. Eistentrager"8 to
further support the notion that the Constitution was not intended to
extend to aliens." 9 The general rule gleaned from the Insular Cases is
114. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 111, at 745. "Wherever and whenever [the
United States government] acts it relies on the Constitution as the source of its powers.
Whenever [the government] acts, it must . . . accept the [Constitutional] limits on its
power ....
115. See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 170 (1968). Schwartz wrote:
The dominant conception when the Framers wrote was that stated in Black-
stone: "By the absolute rights of individuals, we mean those which are so in
their primary and strictest sense; such as would belong to their persons merely
in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of
society or in it."
Id. This source interprets the Constitution's purpose as that of preventing arbitrary
government restraints on natural rights. See also Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Con-
stitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV.
843 (1978).
116. 110 S. Ct. at 1061, citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-626
(1886). The majority also referred to § 1 of An Act Further to Protect the Commerce
of the United States, Ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578 (1798), enacted during a period when France
interfered with American commercial trade. This statute granted President Adams the
authority to permit American military vessels to seize French military vessels found
within the jurisdictional limits of the United States or on the high seas.
117. See supra note 75.
118. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court denied writs of
habeas corpus by enemy aliens arrested in China and imprisoned in Germany following
World War II. The prisoners claimed their convictions violated their fifth amendment
due process rights. The Court held that although Constitutional provisions had in some
instances been extended to aliens with connections to the United States, there could be
no extraterritorial application of the fifth amendment.
119. 110 S. Ct. at 1063.
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that people residing in United States territories were not guaranteed all
constitutional rights. 12 0 Instead, "[o]nly fundamental constitutional
rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of those territories.""12 The major-
ity then analogized this rule to the issue before it, holding that if
United States territories were not guaranteed universal Constitutional
protections, "respondent's claim that the protections of the fourth
amendment extend to aliens in foreign nations is even weaker." '2 2 The
majority then referred to its earlier decision in Eistentrager, in which
fifth amendment rights were denied to aliens imprisoned outside the
territory of the United States, holding that "[i]f such is true of the fifth
amendment, which speaks in the relatively universal term of 'person,' it
would seem even more true with respect to the fourth amendment,
which [by its terminology] applies only to 'the people.' ",123
The dissent argued that the Court's decision in Reid v. Covert 1 4
severely restricted the holdings in the Insular Cases,'2 5 indicating that
Reid stood for the proposition that the fourth amendment restricts
American officials' actions wherever and against whomever they act.12 6
However, the majority, in turn, restricted the holding in Reid, stating
that the case merely stood for the proposition that American citizens,
living abroad, could claim fifth and sixth amendment protections. 27
The dissent also attempted to restrict the Eistentrager decision on the
ground that the defendants in that case were not entitled to Constitu-
tional protection because they were enemy soldiers, not because they
were aliens.128 This is a valid distinction, given the Court's rationale in
Eisentrager. Apparently, the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez chose to
120. Id. at 1062.
121. Id., citing Dorr, at 148; Balzac, at 312-313.
122. 110 S. Ct. at 1062.
123. Id. at 1063.
124. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
125. 110 S. Ct. at 1074 (Brennan, J. dissenting), citing Reid, "[i]t is our judg-
ment that neither the [Insular Cases] nor their reasoning should be given any further
expansion." See also Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution -
Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649, 659 (1986)("[t]he Reid decision . . . repre-
sents the abandonment of the nineteenth century concept of strict territoriality").
126. 110 S. Ct. at 1069-1070 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. 110 S. Ct. at 1063. The majority also noted that Reid was only decided by a
plurality and that the concurring opinions in Reid were substantially narrower than
plurality holding. This may help to explain why the Verdugo-Urquidez majority was
unwilling to give much deference to the Reid decision.
128. 110 S. Ct. at 1074, citing Johnson v. Eistentrager, 339 U.S. 763,771-772
(1950)("It is war that exposes the relative vulnerability of the alien's status . . .
[D]isabilities this country lays upon the alien who becomes also an enemy are imposed
temporarily as an incident of war and not as an incident of alienage."
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disregard this part of the Eistentrager Court's rationale.
D. Verdugo-Urquidez's Claim of Substantial Connection to the
United States
Despite its application of the Compact Theory in Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, the majority conceded that fourth amendment protections
would apply to an alien who could claim a substantial connection to the
United States.129 A substantial connection may occur through the
alien's voluntary or legal presence in the United States and his subse-
quent development of ties to this country.130 The majority held that
Verdugo-Urquidez could not establish the existence of such a connec-
tion because his only ties to the United States were through his arrest
and involuntary transfer to the United States,131 This connection was
not substantial enough because Verdugo-Urquidez had only been in the
United States for a few days when DEA agents searched his home in
Mexico.13 2 One problem with the majority's analysis, as the dissent
noted, is that none of the cases cited by the majority, in support of its
contention that voluntary or legal connection to the United States is
necessary to invoke constitutional protections, specifically impose these
requirements.' Additionally, the majority failed to create a standard
to determine the point at which an alien has developed a substantial
enough connection to the United States to claim constitutional protec-
tions."3 Finally, both dissenting opinions and one concurring opinion
held that even if an alien is required to establish substantial connec-
tions to the United States before being permitted to claim constitu-
tional protection, the fact that Verdugo-Urquidez was brought to the
United States to face a criminal prosecution was sufficient to create the
129. 110 S. Ct. at 1064, citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211, 212 (1982)(illegal
aliens may claim equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment); Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945)(resident aliens enjoy first amendment rights); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)(resident aliens enjoy fifth and sixth
Amendment rights).
130. 110 S. Ct. at 1065. The majority seemed to view the necessary connection to
the United States as involving acceptance by the alien of societal obligations.
131. Id. at 1064. The majority held that a lawful but involuntary connection to
the United States was not the result intended by the cases cited in note 129, supra.
132. Id. The majority held that "We do not think the applicability of the fourth
amendment to the search of premises in Mexico should turn on the fortuitous circum-
stance of whether the custodian of its nonresident alien owner had or had not trans-
ported him to the United States at the time the search was made."
133. Id. at 1074 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
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necessary connection to this country. 13 5 This proposition is supported by
the Supreme Court's decision in In re Ross, 36 where the Supreme
Court held that the Constitution applied to aliens "who are brought [to
the United States] for trial for alleged offenses committed
elsewhere. .. ."
While this argument is fairly convincing, there are some policy
reasons against accepting this argument. Creating an exception that
the fourth amendment warrant requirements do not apply to searches
of property owned by aliens located outside the United States would, in
effect, swallow the rule.3 7 It would also force American law enforce-
ment officers to revert back to requesting the assistance of foreign offi-
cials in obtaining evidence abroad, raising joint venture issues. It is bet-
ter to set a definite standard that can be applied uniformly throughout
the judicial system, even if the standard distinguishes between Ameri-
can citizens and resident aliens on one hand and nonresident aliens on
the other.'38 The judiciary may also choose, at a later date, to place
some restrictions on the actions of American law enforcement officers
by requiring any American operation abroad to comply with the laws
of the foreign country involved. 39 Additionally, the courts may also
require that any search by American officers be reasonable. This ap-
peared to be the opinion of both concurring opinions in Verdugo-Ur-
quidez and in one of the dissents."
135. See, e.g., 110 S. Ct. at 1078 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), "[W]hen a foreign
national is held accountable for purported violations of United States criminal laws, he
has effectively been treated as one of 'the governed' and therefore is entitled to fourth
amendment protections."
136. 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
137. It is hard to imagine a scenario where law enforcement officials decline to
prosecute an alien defendant if evidence was found during a search of the alien's
property.
138. This suggestion has a foundation in prior Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g.,
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)("In the exercise of its broad power ...
Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."). If
Congress is empowered to act in a discriminatory manner, the Supreme Court, within
the confines of its judicial authority, has similar power.
139. Note that this issue was not before the Supreme Court in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, and therefore was not addressed.
140. See, e.g., 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring)(agreeing with the Gov-
ernment's contention "that the search conducted by the United States agents with the
approval and cooperation of the Mexican authorities was not 'unreasonable' as that
term is used in the first clause of the Amendment"). Note also that both Justice Ste-
vens and Justice Kennedy held in their concurring opinions that it should be unneces-
sary for American officials to obtain a United States warrant because "American mag-
istrates have no power to authorize such searches." Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Paynor,'4' that
"willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name of law enforce-
ment. . . . do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of
illegality. Instead, they must be weighed against the considerable harm
that would flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary
rule." 42
There is a trend in society to allow the use of "draconian" mea-
sures in combatting the drug problem that exists in this country. Con-
gress has already enacted laws to facilitate the arrest and conviction of
drug distributors 4 ' and some commentators have feared this attitude
has lead and will continue to lead the Supreme Court to justify illegal
actions on the part of American law enforcement in solving drug-re-
lated crimes." The Court has taken a more active role in recent years
in directing the course of the fourth amendment. 45 The question of
whether the government won, or deserved to win, in these cases did not
appear to be important. Rather they represent an increased desire on
the government's part to expand its enforcement powers. Additionally,
it appears that when the Supreme Court weighs the collective public
interest in competent law enforcement against the individual defend-
ant's due process and liberty interests, the social interest generally tri-
umphs. 4 The Court has expressly stated that "[t]he public has a com-
pelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly drugs for
personal profit."'147 This has lead some commentators to believe that a
"drug exception" to the fourth amendment is growing. 48
141. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
142. Id. at 734.
143. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. Section 1342 (Supp.
1986). See also the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. 1956 (Supp. 1987) (im-
posing some of the severest penalties in the Code for various drug related offenses).
144. See, e.g., S. Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the
Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 889 (1987). "[The Constitution]... is rapidly being
eroded by a positivist, bureaucratic attitude that we can-must-do whatever is deemed
necessary or expedient in waging the War on Drugs." Id. at 890.
145. Id. at 907. "The Supreme Court's 1982-1983 term was marked by 'the over-
whelming importance of the fourth amendment in drug cases' . . . the Supreme Court
put its imprimatur on the enforcement techniques of the drug agencies . . . ." Id. citing
the Supreme Court's term, 52 U.S.L.W. 3151 (U.S. Sept. 13, 1983).
146. Id. at 909. This result was particularly true if there existed a public percep-
tion of a drug crisis.
147. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980).
148. See generally Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment,
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 257 (1983); Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics:
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The decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez supports this
belief. The decision in this case can be justified by existing case law
and the Court may very well have reached the correct result. However,
it should be noted that the cases relied upon by the majority are much
older than the cases cited by the dissent and were, in some instances,
limited by the subsequent decisions. Additionally, the majority's read-
ing of prior case law seems strained at times. It could certainly be ar-
gued that in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez the majority of the
Supreme Court reached its conclusion first and then sought supporting
authority. Whether or not Verdugo-Urguidez is an extension of the
drug exception to the fourth amendment cannot be determined, but will
certainly be of interest in the future.
The Fourth Amendment, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1986).
